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THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERTY 
Lawrence B. Solum* 
THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY: JUSTICE AND THE RULE OF LAW. 
By Randy E. Barnett. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 1998. Pp. xi, 347. 
$29.95. 
INTRODUCTION 
Randy Barnett's The Structure of Liberty1 is an ambitious book. 
The task that Barnett sets himself is to offer an original and persua­
sive argument for a libertarian political theory, a theory that chal­
lenges the legitimacy of the central institutions of the modern 
regulatory-welfare state. The Structure of Liberty is that rare crea­
ture, a book that delivers on most of the promises it makes. 
Already the book is on its way to becoming a contemporary classic, 
the successor in interest to Robert Nozick's Anarchy, State and 
Utopia as a source of ideas and arguments for the revitalization of 
an important intellectual tradition that has long stood at the periph­
ery of legal and political theory. No one \vill be surprised that 
Barnett's argument rests on a controversial and contested vision of 
human interaction. What may come as a shock is the power of this 
vision to provoke a thoughtful response from readers with ideologi­
cal and political commitments that are poles apart from those ar­
ticulated in The Structure of Liberty. 
One of the great virtues of The Structure of Liberty2 is that it is 
written with an unusual clarity of expression. Structure avoids a 
central vice of much contemporary political philosophy: the book is 
filled with concrete examples and specific public policy proposals. 
At the same time, Structure embraces the central virtue of modern 
political theory; the argument is carefully articulated so as to lay 
bare the bones of the ideas and expose them to careful scrutiny. 
Barnett has written a readable book that nonetheless will repay 
careful study. 
Despite Structure's many strengths, the book is not without its 
flaws. Chief of these is the book's avoidance of fundamental ques­
tions about the nature of political justification. Barnett attempts to 
* Professor of Law and William M. Rains Fellow, Loyola Law School, Loyola 
Marymount University. B.A. 1981, University of California at Los Angeles; J.D. 1984, 
Harvard. - Ed. 
1. Randy Barnett is the Austin B. Fletcher Professor of Law at Boston University School 
of Law. 
2. Hereinafter STRUCTURE. 
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craft an argument that eschews reliance on any particular frame­
work for political and moral theory. The result, however, is a work 
that neither embraces deep foundations nor provides a compelling 
explanation for their absence. For this reason, the full implications 
of Structure are cloudy, and a final assessment of its merits requires 
an excavation of its foundations - an effort that is begun but 
hardly completed in this review. 
What is certain is that Structure provides a rich and provocative 
set of arguments that will stimulate strong reactions from both the 
friends and foes of its intriguing mix of classical liberalism, libertari­
anism, and anarchism. Structure is filled with radical proposals, 
ranging from the abolition of criminal punishment to the suggestion 
that private adjudication and law enforcement services could 
replace the state entirely. Barnett defends these suggestions with 
common-sense ideas that are assembled into a powerful theoretical 
framework. Even if Structure does not convert the heathen, it will 
surely change the topic of many conversations about the proper 
function of law. 
!. THE STRUCTURE OF STRUCTURE 
The central argument of Structure aims to justify a set of ideas 
about fair social organization. Barnett calls these ideas "the liberal 
conception of justice" (p. 63). The argument for the liberal concep­
tion focuses on three central problems of human interaction: the 
problem of knowledge, the problem of interest, and the problem of 
power. Barnett argues that given "the goal of enabling persons to 
survive and pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while living in 
society with others" (p. 23), these fundamental problems of human 
interaction create constraints on the possible forms of social organi­
zation. Unless society is organized to respect rights of several prop­
erty, freedom of contract, restitution, and self-defense, the 
problems of knowledge, interest, and power will make it impossible 
for all persons (or each and every person) to survive and pursue 
happiness, peace, and prosperity. Barnett's liberal conception of 
justice is simply a detailed formulation of the content of the rights 
that must be respected.3 Near the conclusion of Structure, Barnett 
imagines a society that respects these rights to the hilt, a polycentric 
3. The liberal conception of justice is given eight formulations at various points in The 
Structure of Liberty, each formulation adding content to the conception as the problems of 
knowledge, interest, and power are developed. The last formulation gives the fullest sense of 
Barnett's views and it is quoted here in full: 
Formulation 8. Justice is respect for the rights or individuals and associations. 
(1) The right of several property specifies a right to acquire, possess, use, and dispose of 
scarce physical resources - including their own bodies. Resources may be used in 
any way that does not physically interfere with other persons' use and enjoyment of 
their resources. While most property rights are freely alienable, the right to one's 
person is inalienable. 
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constitutional order in which the state has withered and been 
replaced by private associations which provide what economists 
have traditionally called "public goods," such as police protection 
and dispute resolution. 
A. Foundations 
If the central argument of Structure is the justification of the 
liberal conception of justice based on the problems of knowledge, 
interest, and power, the first chapter is Barnett's attempt to build 
the philosophical foundation upon which this justification rests. 
This chapter is perhaps the least satisfying in the book, and the 
issues that it raises will be examined later in this review. The cen­
tral organizing idea is the notion of a natural right. Borrowing ter­
minology from Philippa Foot,4 Barnett argues that natural rights 
(2) The right of first possession specifies that property rights to unowned resources are 
acquired by being the first to establish control over them and to stake their claim[.] 
(3) The right of freedom of contract specifies that a rightholder's consent is both neces­
sary (freedomfrom contract) and sufficient (freedom to contract) to transfer alien­
able property rights - both during one's life and, by using a "will," upon one's 
death. A manifestation of assent is ordinarily necessary unless one party somehow 
has access to the other's subjective intent. 
(4) Violating these rights by force or fraud is unjust. 
(5) The right of restitution requires that one who violates the rights that define justice 
must compensate the victim of the rights violation for the harm caused by the injus­
tice, and such compensation may be collected by force, if necessary. The principle 
of strict proportionality limits the amount of restitution to that which is necessary to 
fully compensate, but not overcompensate, the victim. 
(6) The right of self-defense permits the use of force against those who threaten to 
violate the rights of another. Normal self-defense is permissible when the commis­
sion of a rights violation is imminent. Extended self-defense is permissible when a 
person has communicated, by prior rights violations or some other prior conduct 
proven to a high degree of certainty, a threat to violate rights in the future. Self· 
defense should be proportionate to the risk posed by the threat. 
P. 214. 
4. One difficulty that philosophically-trained readers may have with Structure is Barnett's 
tendency to adapt terminology and theories to his own purposes, even when the ideas that he 
borrows had quite different meanings and functions in their original context. Thus, Philippa 
Foot's use of the phrase "hypothetical imperative" is located in her work in metaethics, but 
Barnett does not discuss metaethical issues when he invokes her work. Compare Philippa 
Foot, Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives, 81 PHIL. REv. 305 (1972), with pp. 17-
18. 
A similar difficulty exists with respect to Barnett's use of H.L.A. Hart's notion of the 
minimum content of the natural law. Hart introduces this notion to show that the constraints 
on the nature of law imposed by the human condition are very weak indeed, whereas Barnett 
invokes Hart's notion in support of what, at first blush, might seem to be the opposite conclu­
sion, i.e., that fundamental problems of human nature impose very strong constraints on the 
content of the law. This seeming opposition is dissolved once we appreciate that Hart intro­
duced his idea to show that nature imposes very weak constraints on the concept of law, that 
is, on what can count as a "law," from the point of view of philosophical analysis. See H.L.A. 
HART, THE CoNCEPI' OF LAW 188-89 (1961). Barnett uses Hart's terminology for the very 
different purpose of showing that nature imposes very strong constraints on what laws can be 
justified. P. 11. Barnett would not claim that his argument establishes that compliance with 
his liberal conception of justice is required for a norm to count as a law. 
It would be unfortunate if criticism of Structure were to focus on Barnett's lamentable 
tendency to credit others with ideas that are actually his own. Although Barnett's adaptation 
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are justified by a "hypothetical imperative" (p. 17). As laid out by 
Barnett, the hypothetical imperative includes both a normative and 
a factual predicate. The normative predicate is the goal of provid­
ing each individual with the opportunity to pursue happiness, 
peace, and prosperity. The factual predicate is provided by 
Barnett's development of the problems of knowledge, interest, and 
power. The conclusion or imperative is the set of rights that 
Barnett specifies in his liberal conception of justice, e.g., several 
property, freedom of contract, restitution, and self-defense. 
Asking the following question can draw out an important ambi­
guity in Structure's foundation: to whom is the hypothetical imper­
ative addressed? One possible answer is that Structure is addressed 
to the interest of each and every actual individual in peace, prosper­
ity, and happiness. If this is the case, then the argument of Structure 
must meet an extraordinarily high burden. Surely there are some 
individuals who are advantaged by legal regimes that restrict prop­
erty and contract rights: o�e example might be highly placed mem­
bers of the nomenclatura in the former Soviet Union. Another 
possibility is that the argument of Structure is addressed to hypo­
thetical individuals behind a Rawlsian veil of ignorance5 as to their 
present circumstances. If Barnett intends his argument to rest on 
this sort of contractarian premise, then Structure fails to acknowl­
edge the many criticisms that have been leveled at this form of 
political justification. Yet another possibility is that the hypotheti­
cal imperative is addressed to society as a whole. For example, it 
might be the case that the argument of Structure is based on a utili­
tarian principle of the greatest "happiness, peace, and prosperity" 
for the greatest number. If Structure rests on this sort of conse­
quentialism, then Barnett owes us an explanation for Structure's 
failure to deal with the many objections to consequentialism raised 
by moral and political philosophers. These foundational questions 
are important, and they will be taken up again, after this brief over­
view of the structure of Structure has been completed. 
B. The Method of Structure 
After the first chapter, most of Structure is devoted to the devel­
opment of the thesis that the liberal conception of justice is the best 
solution to the problems of knowledge (chapters 2-6), interest 
(chapters 7-9), and power (chapters 10-14). A preliminary word 
about the method of Structure may help to clarify the nature of 
Barnett's claims and his arguments for them. The central claims of 
Structure are empirical. Barnett argues for the existence of the 
of the terminology and ideas of others to suit his own purposes introduces some confusion in 
his exposition, this is, at bottom, a problem of style and not of substance. 
5. See JoHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JusnCE 136-42 {1971). 
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problems of knowledge, interest, and power on the basis of evi­
dence about the nature of human beings and their social interac­
tion. How does Barnett support these empirical claims? For the 
most part, the answer to this question is not through the use of 
social science research or history. Rather, Barnett's method is pri­
marily to appeal to common-sense premises that are likely to be 
widely shared. Some readers may object to this method on the 
ground that it is insufficiently rigorous. There is certainly some­
thing to this objection. Before we make radical changes in social 
organization on the basis of Barnett's arguments, we would surely 
want to subject his empirical premises to the most rigorous testing, 
employing all of the resources of social science to the extent that 
they would provide useful confirmation or refutation of Barnett's 
views. Nonetheless, Barnett's method stands in an important tradi­
tion of social thought. Some of his armchair observations about 
human nature rely on the same sort of insights as did similar obser­
vations made by Thomas Hobbes and Adam Smith. Some of the 
empirical premises of Structure might be viewed as plausible 
hypotheses as opposed to proven conclusions. Some of Barnett's 
premises are, in fact, unassailable on empirical grounds. For exam­
ple, it is obviously true that each of us has empirical knowledge 
about our own circumstances that is not shared by total strangers 
(p. 31); social science will have little to add concerning the truth of 
such premises. 
C. Knowledge, Interest, and Power 
Much of the merit of Structure lies in its detailed development 
of Barnett's central thesis - that the problems of knowledge, inter­
est, and power require the liberal conception of justice, given the 
goal of providing each individual with the opportunity to pursue 
happiness, security, and stability. Not only does the development 
of the problems of knowledge, interest, and power account for the 
lion's share of Structure's text; this exposition is the heart of 
Barnett's argument. The success or failure of Structure lies in 
Barnett's ability to persuade readers that these are serious 
problems and that no form of social organization can succeed unless 
they are overcome. 
1. Three Problems of Knowledge 
The first cluster of problems of social interaction, Barnett calls 
"[t]he [p]roblems of [k]nowledge" (p. 27). There are actually three 
distinct problems of knowledge. The first of these (called "the first­
order problem of knowledge") focuses on the relationship between 
individualized knowledge and effective resource use. The identifi­
cation of this problem is not original with Barnett, who acknowl-
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edges the work of the economist Friedrich Hayek.6 Each individual 
has personal knowledge (of her own perceptions, preferences, 
needs, desires, abilities, and opportunities) that is; for the most part, 
inaccessible to other members of society (pp. 30-31). In addition, 
each individual has local knowledge that is shared only by limited 
groups or associations (p. 34). In order for individuals to be able to 
use resources, they must act on the basis of their personal and local 
knowledge, yet take into account their ignorance of the personal 
and local knowledge that is in the possession of others (p. 36). This 
problem is relevant to one of the basic questions about desirable 
forms of social organization: should society be ordered on the basis 
of centralized authority or decentralized individual decisionmaking 
(pp. 45-50)? Barnett argues that jurisdiction over resources should 
be vested so as to permit the use of personal and local knowledge 
relevant to use of the particular resources. Individuals should be 
given rights of exclusive control over the resources they will use (p. 
52). Permitting consensual transfer of jurisdiction over resources 
allows individuals to use their personal and local knowledge. 
Requiring that such transfers be consensual provides a mechanism 
by which each individual can take into account the personal and 
local knowledge of others that is relevant to the use of the resource; 
that mechanism is the market price (pp. 52-54). These arguments 
are the foundations for Barnett's first formulation of the liberal 
conception of justice, which includes the right of several property, 
the right of first possession, and the right of freedom of contract (p. 
83). 
The second-order problem of knowledge deals with the difficul­
ties created by the need to make rights publicly available - that is, 
to make knowledge of the actions required by justice available to 
everyone (p. 85). Barnett recognizes that this problem of knowl­
edge is closely connected with the ideal of the rule of law, and, in 
particular, with the notion that the rule of law requires that the law 
be public (p. 89). Barnett draws a distinctive conclusion from this 
requirement, one that is key to his claim that solving the problems 
of knowledge, interest, and power requires a minimal role for the 
state. The key idea is that in order for individuals to know what the 
law is, the set of legal rights must satisfy the requirement of com­
possibility. Compossibility requires that exercise of any right by a 
citizen be guaranteed not to interfere with the exercise of any right 
by any other citizen. This entails the conclusion that rights cannot 
contradict or be in tension with one another (pp. 90-92). Putting it 
another way, each individual must have a sphere of liberty that does 
not invade the sphere of any other individual. This move is impor-
6. Pp. 29-30. See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, The Use of Knowledge in Society, in !NDIVIDUAL 
AND ECONOMIC ORDER 77 (1948). 
1786 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1780 
tant, because it justifies the limitation of the liberal conception of 
justice to negative rights, such as rights of property and contract. 
The corollary of this limitation is that positive rights, such as a right 
to welfare, are excluded. Positive rights can collide with negative 
rights and hence can violate the requirement of compossibility. 
The second-order problem of knowledge constrains the substan­
tive content of the law in another way. It is possible to distinguish 
between legal rules on the basis of their ability to provide certain 
guidance in concrete cases. Barnett demonstrates this point with 
one of many illustrative stories involving a fictional pair, Ann and 
Ben. Imagine, for example, that the law provides the following rule 
for the acquisition of land: "The one who needs the land the most 
gets it." Does this rule communicate a determinate standard for 
conduct that could guide the actions of Ben and Ann? 
Assume that both Ann and Ben are well aware of this precept in 
advance of any dispute between them. Ben comes across the clearing. 
Can he know that he needs it more than Ann? When Ann returns, 
how can she know whether to vacate or remain? The substance of 
this precept gives rise to a second-order problem of knowledge con­
cerning what justice requires. [p. 100] 
A rule that grants the first possessor jurisdiction over the land 
might be underdeterminate in particular cases but it would not be 
inherently uncertain in the same way that the greater-need-for-the­
land rule must be (p. 100). 
The third-order problem of knowledge concerns the need to 
specify concrete and particular conventions of justice that can guide 
action (p. 108). This problem arises in part because a theory of jus­
tice underdetermines the content of action-guiding rules. For 
example, the abstract formulations of the rights to private property 
and freedom of contract that Barnett specifies in his liberal concep­
tion of justice are insufficiently concrete to decide particular dis­
putes. In order to overcome this part of the problem, some process 
for specifying the content of the rules must be instituted. This pro­
cess of specification requires knowledge of the complexities of 
human interaction (pp. 113-14). Barnett claims that an evolution­
ary process of common-law adjudication is the preferred solution to 
the third-order problem of knowledge (pp. 114-30). 
2. The Problems of Interest 
Independent of problems of knowledge are problems of inter­
est. Barnett identifies three of these. The first is the problem of 
partiality. If each individual is to pursue happiness, then social 
interaction must be structured so as to allow individuals to pursue 
their own interests. Yet partiality to one's own interests may inter­
fere with the pursuit by others of their interests (pp. 135-38). 
Barnett claims that decentralized jurisdiction over resources in the 
May 1999] Structure of Liberty 1787 
form of property rights and freedom of contract solves the problem 
of partiality. A regime of property and contract allows individuals 
to pursue their own projects and interests. Moreover, property 
rights and the requirement that transfer be consensual insure that 
each must take the interests of the other into account before using 
resources over which the other has jurisdiction (pp. 139-41). 
Barnett illustrates these abstract points with another fable of Ann 
and Ben: 
If Ben wants to build a home on a comer of the land that Ann has 
cultivated for crops, then he must offer Ann something she would 
prefer to that which he is asking her to give up. In this way, Ann's 
partial interests are incorporated into Ben's cost of choice. When 
pursuing his personal projects, Ann's rights of several property and 
freedom from contract require Ben to act "impartially" with respect 
to Ann's interest whether he wants to or not. [p. 140] 
The problem of partiality illustrates one of the central features of 
the argumentative structure of Structure. Barnett claims that the 
problems of knowledge, interest, and power provide independent 
justifications for the liberal conception of justice. Even if there 
were no problem of knowledge, and Ben had independent knowl­
edge of Ann's interests in her land, Ben's partiality to his own inter­
ests creates the risk that he would act without taking Ann's 
interests into account. And even if Ben were perfectly impartial, he 
could not take Ann's interests into account given that there is a 
problem of knowledge. 
The second problem of interest is the incentive problem. 
Barnett's discussion of this problem begins with the "subjective 
'cost of choice,' "7 i.e., the costs borne by anyone who makes a 
choice involving the use of resources. ·Because of a problem of 
knowledge, only the individual who makes the choice is fully aware 
of the nature and extent of such costs (pp. 150-53). Because of such 
costs, individuals normally require incentives to discover and use 
information about the effective use of resources. Barnett argues 
that a right of first possession, a right of private property, and free­
dom of contract provide a guarantee that individuals who incur 
such costs will not have the benefits taken away from them by 
others. Thus, the liberal conception of justice provides incentives 
for the efficient use of resources (p. 155). In addition, the incentive 
problem justifies the addition of another right to the liberal concep­
tion, a right of restitution: "[O]ne who violates the rights that de­
fine justice must compensate the victim of the rights violation for 
the harm caused by the injustice" (p. 159). 
7. P. 150. Barnett borrows this notion from James Buchanan. See JAMES M. BUCHANAN, 
CoST AND CHorCE: AN INQUIRY IN EcoNOMIC THEORY 42-43 (1969). 
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Barnett's discussion of the incentive problem is also the occa­
sion for a provocative discussion of public goods and free rider 
problems. The conventional economic wisdom about public goods 
is that nonexcludable goods like clean air or national defense can­
not be provided by markets because of free-rider problems. Who 
would sign up for a voluntary national defense subscription? 
Barnett's challenge to this conventional wisdom consists of a 
number of burden-shifting strategies. Primary among these is a 
move that is repeated frequently in Structure: Barnett challenges 
the advocates of state-provided public goods to show that the state 
can actually deliver the goods, given the problems of knowledge, 
interest, and power (p. 162). Another burden-shifting move is to 
suggest that the assumption that markets cannot provide particular 
goods may result from a failure of imagination. Here Barnett in­
vokes the famous example of lighthouses, often assumed to be pub­
lic goods by armchair economists (pp. 163-64), but shown by 
Ronald Coase to be frequently supported by fees charged by 
nearby ports.8 These burden-shifting strategies are surely thought 
provoking, but they hardly carry the day for the radical hypothesis 
(perhaps implicit in Structure, but never explicitly advanced by 
Barnett) that there are no public goods, the provision of which by a 
state would actually advance the common interest in happiness, 
peace, and prosperity. 
The third problem of interest is the compliance problem. The 
liberal conception of justice requires those who violate the rights of 
others to provide restitution for the harm done. But in the absence 
of an enforcement mechanism, rights violators will lack an incentive 
to provide such restitution. Barnett argues that this problem justi­
fies a right to collect such compensation by force (pp. 174-81) and a 
right of self-defense (pp. 185-91). This section of the book provides 
an apt example of Barnett's ability to combine the discussion of 
concrete policy with abstract political theory. In a world where 
many rights violators are sure to be impecunious, the question 
arises as to how compensation is to be collected. Barnett's solution 
is to restructure the public system of prisons into privately owned 
engines of entrepreneurship, with prisoners engaging in market 
transactions both within and without the penal system (pp. 176-81). 
Particularly intriguing is his discussion of Maine's inmate craft pro­
gram, with some inmates supposedly earning as much as $100,000 
per year (p. 180). 
8. See R.H. Coase, The Lighthouse in Economics, 17 J. LAW & EcoN. 357, 360-62 (1974). 
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3. The Problems of Power 
The third and final set of problems of social interaction consists 
of problems of power. Although Barnett claims that the problems 
of knowledge and interest are independent of one another, the 
problem of power is derivative of the problem of interest in the 
following sense: because the compliance problem justifies the use 
of force, the problem of power arises in connection with such uses 
of force. Absent problems of interest, the problem of power would 
not necessarily arise. There are two distinct problems of power, the 
problem of enforcement (and nonenforcement) error and the prob­
lem of enforcement abuse. 
The problem of enforcement error arises because no system of 
enforcement will be error-free. Some individuals who have not vio­
lated rights will be forced to pay compensation, and some individu­
als whose rights have been violated will not receive compensation. 
A similar problem arises with respect to erroneous use of self­
defense. Thus, the question arises as to how to minimize the sever­
ity and frequency of enforcement error (pp. 198-99). Barnett's pro­
posal for reducing the severity of enforcement error is both simple 
and controversial. Barnett argues for a principle of strict propor­
tionality, "that the amount of the sanction be limited to what is nec­
essary to fully compensate without overcompensating the victim" 
(p. 204). 
Barnett then argues against the deterrence theory of punish­
ment on a number of grounds. One of these is notable because it 
represents a departure from the general argumentative strategy of 
Structure. Barnett argues that imposing severe sanctions in order to 
increase the deterrent effect of punishment is open to moral criti­
cism on the grounds that such punishments will inevitably also be 
visited on innocent persons because of the problem of enforcement 
error (p. 228). The moral intuition to which Barnett appeals is 
surely plausible, but it would seem to rely on some prior notion of a 
moral right that is independent of the concern for happiness, peace, 
and prosperity. Barnett also argues that increasing the severity of 
punishment may not translate into actual deterrence for a variety of 
reasons. Among these are that criminals may simply become more 
effective at evading punishment, or they may have such a high dis­
count rate for future costs that severity will have little effect on 
their choices (p. 230). 
The problem of enforcement abuse is actually a more specific 
form of the problem of partiality. Given that those with the power 
to impose punishments will be partial to their own interests, the 
power to punish or to use force to compel restitution is likely to be 
abused. Barnett argues that the problem of enforcement abuse is 
not resolved by what he calls the single power principle, the notion 
1790 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1780 
that there must exist a single institution with a monopoly on the 
coercive use of force for each geographical territory (pp. 240-50). If 
power is structured in a simple hierarchy, there is no guarantee that 
those at the top will not themselves abuse power (p. 244). Nor do 
institutional constraints provide a guarantee against such abuses. 
For example, Barnett argues that divided government with a 
scheme of checks and balances is not a sufficient safeguard: "Even­
tually, entrepreneurs of power - master politicians, judges, execu­
tives, or outsiders called 'special interest groups' - figure out ways 
to teach those who share the monopoly that each has an interest in 
cooperating with the others in using force against those who are 
outside the monopoly" (p. 254). Similar arguments are advanced 
against the contentions that democratic elections (pp. 251-52) or a 
right of exit (pp. 254-55) can guard against enforcement abuse. 
D. A Polycentric Constitutional Order 
With the discussion of the problem of enforcement abuse, 
Structure negotiates a crucial tum. The argument up to this point 
justifies a strong set of rights, but does not address the question of 
institutional structure. Barnett's discussion of the problem of 
enforcement abuse sets up the most radical and controversial chap­
ters of Structure entitled "Constitutional Constraints on Power" and 
"Imagining a Polycentric Constitutional Order: A Short Fable." In 
these chapters, Barnett moves beyond the strong classical liberalism 
or modest libertarianism that characterize the bulk of Structure and 
offers suggestions that are radically libertarian and even anarchist 
in nature. 
The key idea here is that of a polycentric constitutional order -
a regime in which "multiple legal systems exercise the judicial func­
tion and multiple law-enforcement agencies exercise the executive 
function" (p. 258). No state acts to coordinate these private entities 
or resolve disputes between them. All power is private power, reg­
ulated by contractual agreements between individuals and judicial 
or law-enforcement enterprises. Even readers who are still on the 
boat when Structure reaches these uncharted waters may wish to 
disembark at this point. One difficulty that is likely to occur to 
many readers is parallel to Hobbes's argument in Leviathan for his 
version of the single power principle. Wouldn't jurisdictional con­
flicts between the various executive and judicial agencies degener­
ate into the war of all against all in which there are "no Arts; no 
Letters; no Society; and which is worst of all, continuall feare, and 
danger of violent death; And the life of man, solitary, poore, nasty, 
brutish and short"?9 Barnett recognizes this problem and appeals 
9. THOMAS HoBBES, LEVIATHAN 89 (Richard Tuck ed., 1991). 
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to a variety of real-world examples of voluntary cooperation 
between competing legal systems for dealing with jurisdictional 
conflicts, including rules governing choice of law and personal juris­
diction (p. 277). But merely pointing to such phenomena is not suf­
ficient to make out Barnett's argument, because these mechanisms 
work in the context of a legal order that subscribes to the single 
power principle. 
Barnett does advance an argument against the likelihood that 
Hobbesian problems would emerge from a polycentric constitu­
tional order. The crucial passage is worth quoting at length: 
Extended conflicts between different court systems in a polycentric 
constitutional order are also quite unlikely. It is simply not in the 
interest of repeat players (and most of their clients) to attempt to 
obtain short-run gains at the cost of long-run conflict . . .. [W]here 
they have the opportunity to cooperate, participants in even the most 
intense conflicts - warfare, for example - tend to evolve a "live and 
let live" philosophy. [p. 276] 
These remarks are suggestive, but hardly dispositive of the 
Hobbesian objection. The eminent Hobbes scholar Sharon Lloyd 
summarizes one interpretation of Hobbes's argument as follows: 
The state of nature is a state of war because scarcity of resources rela­
tive to demand leads to competition; competition, to fear of invasion 
(compounded by fear of invasion, not by the needy but by prideful 
people in pursuit of glory); fear of invasion, to preemptive aggression; 
and fear of preemptive aggression, to further preemptive aggression. 
Given this state of affairs, it is rational for people to make preemptive 
attacks on their fellows.10 
Of course, neither Barnett's optimism nor Hobbes's pessimism may 
accurately predict the fate of a polycentric constitutional order. 
Surely, however, more is required than Barnett has offered for soci­
ety to feel confident enough to make the leap to the utopian world 
where the state has been replaced by private courts and law 
enforcement agencies. 
E. Responses to Objections 
The final chapter of Structure offers replies to a number of ob­
jections. These replies are brief and suggestive in nature, and they 
are not likely to satisfy Barnett's critics. The sort of strategy pur­
sued in the replies is illustrated by Barnett's consideration of two 
questions that are likely to be raised about Structure. Why are the 
problems of knowledge, interest, and power the only problems ad­
dressed by the liberal conception of justice? Why not the problem 
of inequality, or the problem of need, or some other problem? 
Barnett's strategy here is not to take these problems head on, but 
10. S.A. LLOYD, IDEALS AS INTERESTS IN HOBBES'S LEVIATHAN 9-10 {1992). 
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instead to use the central argunient of Structure to shift the burden 
of going forward back to those who raise the questions: 
One ought not to infringe upon the rights and procedures that make a 
well-ordered social life possible to address other pressing problems if 
doing so will seriously undermine our ability to address the problems 
of knowledge, interest, and power. Addressing these problems is a 
prerequisite to any hope we have of effectively handling the other 
problems of social life. A society that failed to deal effectively with 
the problems of knowledge, interest, and power would be in chaos. 
And a society in chaos cannot deal effectively with any social prob­
lem, however serious it may, 
be. [p. 326] 
Stated in this fashi.on, Barnett's move may leave his critics substan­
tial room for maneuver. Grant to Barnett the premise that the 
problems of knowledge, interest, and power must be addressed to 
some degree to avoid social chaos. Further grant that social chaos 
would preclude the resolution of other social problems such as need 
or inequality. It may not be difficult for Barnett's critics to show 
that a society that does not fully respect the rights contained in the 
liberal conception of justice can nonetheless solve the problems of 
knowledge, interest, and power to a degree sufficient to avoid 
chaos. Presumably, modem social welfare states address problems 
of inequality through taxation. and redistribution schemes without 
falling into complete social disorder. 
Barnett makes another burden-shifting reply to critics who may 
raise problems other than those of knowledge, interest, and power. 
He suggests that the burden is on those who advocate state action 
to solve such problems to show that the particular problem they 
pose cannot be solved within the constraints of the liberal concep­
tion of justice. For example, the problem of need might be solved 
by charity; Barnett suggests that history supports this conclusion, 
although he provides rather scanty backing for this claim (p. 326). 
Conducted at this level, the debate between Barnett and his oppo­
nents is not likely to be settled. Resolution of this sort of empirical 
disagreement is sure to be difficult. Barnett and many of his critics 
advocate utopian social structures that, because they do not actually 
exist, do not yield empirical evidence to resolve disputes about their 
relative efficacy in addressing either the problem of need or 
Barnett's problems of knowledge, interest, and power. 
The final chapter of Structure also takes up an objection that is 
related to the problems of need and inequality, the objection that 
Barnett's liberal conception of justice is inadequate because it fails 
to take into account the problem of distributive justice. This objec­
tion and Barnett's reply to it can serve as a vehicle for situating the 
project of Structure in the context of contemporary political 
philosophy. 
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Barnett begins his analysis of this objection by posing a series of 
questions about the alternative theories that advocate forced tak­
ings to achieve distributive justice (p. 309). Some of these questions 
raise the issues debated among theorists of distributive justice 
under the rubric of the "equality of what" debate. Does distribu­
tive justice require equality of welfare, equality of opportunity for 
welfare, equality of resources, satisfaction of Rawls's difference 
principle,U or something else? As Barnett acknowledges, however, 
the lack of consensus about what distributive justice requires does 
not excuse him from answering particular theories of distributive 
justice on their merits (p. 310). Moreover, at least some accounts of 
distributive justice are sufficiently developed (those of Dworkin12 
and Rawls, for example) so that Barnett could address them on 
their merits if he chose to do so. Barnett adopts a different strat­
egy, pleading that because there are so many different theories of 
distributive justice, it is appropriate for him to "focus [on] some of 
the challenges posed for any theory of distributive justice by the 
problems of knowledge, interest, and power" (pp. 310-11). 
Barnett's most persuasive answer to the distributive-justice 
objection is a variation of the burden-shifting strategy employed 
elsewhere in Structure. Barnett challenges these theorists to show 
how their theories can solve the problems of knowledge, interest, 
and power. For example, Barnett makes the following argument 
about the problem of knowledge: 
Let's assume we settle on a particular conception of distributive jus­
tice. We are now faced with the task of determining who will have 
their resources taken away and who will be the beneficiary of the tak­
ing. Whatever the conception of distributive justice one adopts, the 
circumstances of every person in the community, or state, or nation, 
or world will have to be examined to see if they meet the posited 
standard. Does each person have "enough" of the primary goods? 
Which person has a surplus that may be taken from her to give to 
another[?] [p. 311] 
But is this really a problem posed for any theory of distributive 
justice? Because Barnett mentions "primary goods," a feature 
unique to Rawls's theory,13 we can assume t}lat Barnett believes 
that this objection does at least apply to that theory. 
A close examination of Rawls's theory reveals that Barnett's 
questions are premised on fundamental misunderstandings of the 
11. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 76-78. 
12. See Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare, 10 PHIL. & PuB. 
A.FF. 185 {1981); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources, 10 PHIL. 
& PUB. A.FF. 283, 315 (1981); Ronald Dworkin, What ls Equality? Part 3: The Place of Lib­
erty, 73 low A L. REv. 1 {1987); Ronald Dworkin, What is Equality? Part 4: Political Equal­
ity, 22 u.s.F: L. REv. 1, 4 {1987). 
13. See RAWLS, supra note 5, at 62. 
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nature of the theory. A brief explication is required to show why 
this is so. One relevant feature of Rawls's theory is the difference 
principle, which is stated in final form as follows: 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are 
both: 
(a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with 
the just savings principle, and 
(b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions 
of fair equality of opportunity.14 
This principle does not actually apply to all of the "primary goods" 
as Barnett's question implies. Among the primary goods are the 
basic liberties,15 including the right to ownership of private prop­
erty.16 A preliminary point is that Rawls and Barnett are actually 
in agreement on the principle of distribution that applies to the ba­
sic liberties (although they disagree about the list of liberties to be 
incorporated in a conception of justice). Rawls's first principle of 
justice is that "[e]ach person is to have an equal right to the most 
extensive total system of equal basic liberties compatible with a 
similar system of liberty for all."17 Similarly, Barnett holds that the 
rights incorporated in his liberal conception of justice should be 
equal in their distribution. When it comes to the basic liberties, 
Barnett's questions - "Does each person have 'enough' of the pri­
mary goods?" "Which person has a surplus that may be taken from 
her to give to another?" (p. 311) - are simply misplaced. 
With this technical point about the primary goods out of the 
way, the substance of Barnett's objection can be considered. In ad­
dition to the basic liberties, the primary goods also include income 
and wealth.18 Presumably, Barnett's questions are directed at the 
distribution of these primary goods. Once again, however, the 
que�tions are based on a misunderstanding of Rawls's theory. The 
two principles of justice do not apply to individuals directly; instead, 
they apply to the basic structure.19 The question for Rawls is 
whether the institutions that comprise the basic structure of society 
satisfy the difference principle. The question is not whether the 
least advantaged individual in society is benefited by any given ine­
quality in wealth and income. Indeed, Rawls recognizes the very 
problems of knowledge that Barnett raises and relies on them as 
part of the justification for limiting the application of the two prin­
ciples of justice to the basic structure of society: 
14. Id. at 302. 
15. See id. at 62. 
16. See id. at 61. 
17. Id. at 302. 
18. See id. at 61. 
19. See id. at 7. 
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[T]here are no feasible -and -practicable rules that ·it is sensible to im­
pose on individuals that can prevent the erosion of background jus­
tice. This is because the rules governing agreements and individual 
transactions cannot be too complex, or require too much information 
to be correctly applied . . . . Thus any sensible scheme of rules will not 
exceed the capacity of individuals to grasp and follow them with suffi­
cient ease, nor will it burden citizens with requirements of knowledge 
and foresight that they cannot normally meet.20 
The point is that Rawls has structured his theory in order to take 
the problem of knowledge into account. To advance the debate be­
yond this point, Barnett will need to move beyond the formulation 
of generic objections to theories of qistributive justice in the ab­
stract and engage with particular theories, including their responses 
to the problems of knowledge. 
Despite this weakness in Barnett's treatment of the topic of dis­
tributive justice, there is considerable merit in his approach. 
Indeed, Barnett's elaboration of the problem of knowledge sheds 
light on Rawls's discussion of that problem. Moreover, my discus­
sion of Barnett's replies to the distributive justice objection has 
been highly selective. He raises a number of other questions and 
objections that may fare better when they are considered in juxta­
position with particular theories of distributive justice. To clarify, I 
should add that I am n9t offering a critique of Barnett's theory 
from the perspective of Rawls's theory of distributive justice. 
Rather, the point of this discussion is to show that Barnett's attempt 
to shift the burden back to distributive justice critics cannot succeed 
without Barnett's engaging particular theories in depth. 
With this brief examination of the final chapter of Structure, my 
summary of the structure of Barnett's book is complete. I now re­
turn to the topic that begins the book, the theoretical framework 
that forms the foundation of Structure. 
II. THE MORAL FOUNDATIONS OF THE STRUCTURE OF LIBERTY 
A. The Foundational Strategy 
Barnett claims that the argument of Structure is properly located 
in the natural rights tradition (p. 17-25). His interpretation of that 
tradition is based on the notion that natural rights are hypothetical 
imperatives. Given the problems of knowledge, interest, and 
power, if the goal is to enable persons to survive and pursue happi­
ness, peace, and prosperity with others, then the rights specified by 
the liberal conception of justice should be respected. Barnett's ar­
gument is that given certain ends, the means are natural in the same 
sense that the principles used by engineers to build a bridge are 
20. JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 267-68 (1993). 
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natural. Just as a bridge will fall down if the laws governing the 
structural soundness of bridge construction are not obeyed, so a 
human society will fall down if the rights contained in the liberal 
conception of justice are ignored (p. 4-7). 
This account certainly sounds sensible, but it is also ambiguous. 
Initially, we might ask about the goals of happiness, peace, and 
prosperity. What is the content of these ends and why are they 
choice-worthy? Moreover, the relation between happiness, peace, 
and prosperity and individual persons is not formulated precisely. 
Is the goal for each and every person to be happy? To maximize 
the total amount of happiness summed across all persons? To pro­
vide each and every person the opportunity to be happy? Or is it 
something else? These questions are not clearly answered in 
Structure, and one might .even suspect that they are studiously 
avoided. 
More generally, Structure is ambiguous with respect to one of 
the central questions of contemporary political philosophy: should 
justification proceed on the basis of deep foundations in moral phi­
losophy or theology, or should political justification limit itself to 
the shallow resources of public reason? As we shall see, this ques­
tion is crucial to the argument of Structure. I will proceed by exam­
ining the implications of each interpretation in tum. 
Before I begin the task of clarifying the foundations of 
Structure, I should note that Barnett himself believes such founda­
tional work is not essential to his enterprise. After discussing 
whether his approach is consequentialist or deontological, Barnett 
concludes: "Perhaps all this suggests that how we describe or cate­
gorize the analysis I will present here is less important than the 
merits of the analysis itself" (p. 24). But this assumes that the work 
of clarification is merely a matter of applying labels. If that were 
the case, then Barnett would surely be correct to set the problem 
aside as a merely academic exercise. If, on the other hand, ques­
tions about foundations must be answered in order to determine 
what Barnetf s analysis is and therefore what its merits are, then the 
proper answer to foundational inquiries is not a plea of confession 
and avoidance. 
B. Does Structure Rest on Deep Moral Foundations? 
One possible interpretation of Structure is that its arguments 
rest on deep moral foundations. On this interpretation, Structure 
posits a particular set of human interests (in happiness, peace, and 
prosperity) and claims that these interests really are the true and 
universal interests of all persons. These interests are general and 
abstract in nature. Given Barnett's account of the problems of 
knowledge, the claim that these interests are universal need not en-
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tail the further conclusion that there is any .single plan of life that 
leads to happiness for all humans. There might be many plans of 
life that can lead to happiness, and the selection from among these 
might vary from individual to individual. Nonetheless, on the deep­
moral-foundations interpretation of Structure, it would be the case 
that happiness, peace, and prosperity are true and universal human 
interests that would serve as the ultimate moral foundation upon 
which The Structure of Liberty rests. 
1. Happiness, Peace, and Prosperity 
Investigation of the deep-moral-round,ations ,interpretation can 
begin with an examination of "happiness, peace, and prosperity." 
Barnett has very little to say about these foundational ends. 
Indeed, his discussion of them suggests that he does not find ques­
tions about these ends to be fruitful ones: 
This natural law account of moral "principles of society" assumes, of 
course, that "happiness . . . peace and prosperity" are appropriate 
ends. While the essence or nature of happiness, peace and prosperity 
may properly be controversial, should anyone question the assump­
tion that these are desirable ends to be pursued, additional arguments 
will need to be presented. [p. 7] 
To some extent, Barnett is on safe ground when he assumes that 
happiness, peace, and prosperity are desirable ends. If not these 
ends, then which ends? Questions arise immediately, however. Ini­
tially, the three ends do not seem to be of equal moral status. Hap­
piness is a good candidate for a noninstrumental or final end: we 
desire happiness for its own sake and not for the sake of anything 
else. Peace and prosperity, on the other hand, might plausibly be 
viewed as instrumental to happiness. We want peace and prosper­
ity so that we can pursue happiness, not the other way around. If 
these three ends are foundational, it is clear that happiness provides 
the cornerstone of Structure's foundation. 
As Barnett acknowledges, the essence or nature of happiness is 
controversial (p. 7). And the nature of happiness might affect the 
argument of Structure. For example, the classical Aristotelian view 
of happiness is that happiness requires a life of reason involving 
activities done well, that is, in accord with the human excellences or 
virtues.21 One implication of this view might be that an essential 
role of the state is the inculcation of virtue.22 Barnett addresses this 
argument with his now familiar strategy. He argues that the burden 
is on the advocates of state-enforced virtue to show that they can 
21. See ARISTOTLE, N1coMACHEAN ETHICS bk. I, ch. 10 in 2 THE COMPLETE WoRKS OF 
ARISTOTLE at l100al0-1101a21 (Jonathan Barnes ed., 1984). 
22. See id. bk. I, ch. 13, at 1102a5-15; FRED D. Mn.I.ER, JR., NATURE, JUSTICE, AND 
RIGHTS IN ARISToTLE's Politics 13 (1995). 
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overcome the problems of .knowledge, interest, and power (p. 306). 
A full account of virtue, however, might address these issues. For 
example, Barnett's discussion of the problem of knowledge assumes 
that individuals possess the knowledge necessary to make choices 
affecting their own happiness. A virtue-centered theory of the state 
might counter that such knowledge can only be possessed and effec­
tively used by persons who already possess the virtues to a suffi­
cient degree. Perhaps it is the case that only persons with the 
intellectual virtues of theoretical and practical wisdom can make 
use of their individual and local knowledge in a way that leads to 
happiness. This is not the occasion to take up Barnett's challenge 
- to offer a virtue-centered account of the role of the state in the 
promotion of virtue that takes the problems of knowledge, interest, 
and power into full account. Rather, the point is that an investiga­
tion of foundational questions, such as connections between virtue, 
knowledge, and happiness, might undermine fundamental presup­
positions of Barnett's argument. H Barnett contends otherwise -
for example, if he claims that the argument of Structure extends to 
any plausible notion of happiness, irrespective of the conceptual 
framework in which the notion is embedded - then a heavy argu­
mentative burden goes with that contention. After preliminary 
skirmishing about the burden of proof, Barnett will need to get 
down to the difficult task of engaging particular theories of happi­
ness on their merits. 
2. A Utilitarian Interpretation 
Laying aside questions about the nature of happiness, there 
remain questions with respect to the role that happiness plays in 
Barnett's foundational argument. One plausible interpretation of 
Structure is that its foundations are consequentialist or utilitarian. 
The first piece of evidence for this interpretation is negative. On 
the surface, at least, it appears that Barnett does not rely on any 
deontological premises for ultimate foundations. In this regard 
Barnett differs from Robert Nozick, who made self-ownership a 
fundamental premise in the justificatory strategy of Anarchy, State, 
and Utopia.23 Rather, his strategy is similar to that employed by 
John Stuart Mill in On Liberty.24 Like Mill, Barnett seems to forgo 
23. Nozick begins ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA as follows: "Individuals have rights, 
and there are things no person or group may do to them (without violating their rights). So 
strong and far-reaching are these rights that they raise the question of what, if anything, the 
state and its officials may do." ROBERT NOZICK, ANARCHY, STATE, AND UTOPIA ix (1974). 
24. See John Stuart Mill, On Liberty, in UTILITARIANISM, ON LIBERTY AND 
CONSIDERATIONS ON REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 74 (H.B. Acton ed., 1972) ("It is 
proper to state that I forego any advantage which could be derived to my argument from the 
idea of abstract right, as a thing independent of utility. I regard utility as the ultimate appeal 
on all ethical questions . . . .  "). 
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any advantage that could be derived by. assuming self-ownership, 
autonomy, or rights of personhood. 
Tue second piece of evidence for the consequentialist interpre­
tation of Structure is the reliance on happiness, peace, and prosper­
ity as the normative predicates in Barnett's hypothetical imperative. 
Barnett introduces these ends by quoting a sermon delivered by 
Elizur Goodrich to the Governor and General Assembly of 
Connecticut on the eve of the Constitutional Convention: "No 
more can mankind be conducted to happiness; or civil societies 
united, and enjoy peace and prosperity, without observing the 
moral principles and connections, which the same Almighty Crea­
tor has established for the government of the moral world."25 More 
particularly, Structure takes as a given "the goal of enabling persons 
to survive and pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while living 
in society with others" (p. 23). Because Barnett has so little to say 
about this goal, it is not clear whether the goal is to maximize hap­
piness, peace, and prosperity, to provide each person with a suffi­
cient amount of these goods, or something else. A maximizing 
interpretation is not wholly implausible, however, and the notion 
that happiness should be maximized is a straightforward version of 
eudaimonistic utilitarianism.26 
A third piece of evidence is Barnett's use of consequentialist 
reasoning in his explication of the first problem of interest, in other 
words, the problem of partiality. Recall that Barnett argued that 
the problem of partiality justified the rights of several property and 
freedom from contract. Why was this so? Tue example of Ann and 
Ben, quoted above, provided the reason: "When pursuing his per­
sonal projects, Ann's rights of several property and freedom from 
contract require Ben to act 'impartially' with respect to Ann's inter­
est whether he wants to or not" (p. 140). But why is "impartiality" 
required? Tue consequentialist interpretation of Barnett provides a 
natural explanation: utilitarians sum interests (utility) across per­
sons. Ben should be impartial with respect to Ann's interests 
because the right outcome is the outcome that maximizes the sum 
of Ann and Ben's utility. Impartiality across the interests of per­
sons is a quintessentially utilitarian idea.27 
25. Elizur Goodrich, The Principles of Civil Union and Happiness Considered and 
Recommended, in PoLmcAL SERMONS OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDING ERA: 1730-1805, at 
915 (Ellis Sandoz ed., 1991) (quoted at p. 1). 
26. Eudaimonistic utilitarianism takes as its maximand happiness, as opposed to 
preference-satisfaction utilitarianism (maximizing preference-satisfaction), hedonistic utilita­
rianism (maximizing the balance of pleasures over pains), or welfare utilitarianism (maximiz­
ing interests). See generally Eudaimonism, Tue Cambridge Dictionary of Philosophy 251 
(Robert Audi ed. 1995); ROBERT E. GoooIN, UTILITARIANISM AS A PuBLIC PHILOSOPHY 13 
(1995). 
27. See Robert E. Goodin, Utility and the Good in A CoMPANION To ETHICS 20 (Peter 
Singer ed. 1993). 
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The fourth and most salient piece of evidence is Barnett's 
explicit discussion of the question as to whether his theory is utilita­
rian. It is interesting that Barnett does not take an unequivocal 
stand, even though he recognizes the question. The crucial passage 
is worth quoting at length: 
Is a natural rights analysis utilitarian? Though this type of philo­
sophical question is really beyond the scope of this book, for what it is 
worth, my answer depends on how the term "utilitarian" is used. If 
utilitarian is viewed as a consequentialist approach that evaluates 
practices by their consequences, then the conception of natural rights 
sketched here appears to be consequentialist, though only indirectly. 
If utilitarianism is viewed as a general theory of ethics or morality, 
however, then the natural rights approach presented here, though 
consequentialist, is not utilitarian. The approach presented here does 
not provide a theory of how persons ought to pursue the good life, the 
traditional province of ethics. [p. 23] 
Barnett is simply declaring himself in these passages; he is not pro­
viding an argument for (or even an explanation of) his position. 
What are we to make of these remarks? One clue to Barnett's 
position is that his position "evaluates practices by their conse­
quences" and that it is "consequentialist, though only indirectly" (p. 
23). Here we need to be cautious. When Barnett refers to the eval­
uation of practices as opposed to acts by their consequences, he is 
likely referring to a distinction akin to that between act and rule 
utilitarianism. When he refers to indirect as opposed to direct con­
sequentialism, he might be referring to the act/rule distinction or he 
might be referring to the difference between direct consequential­
ism as a practical standard for decisionmaking and indirect conse­
quentialism as a theory for the evaluation of practical standards for 
decisionmaking. If Barnett intends the latter meaning by his refer­
ence to indirect utilitarianism, then his discussion may conflate two 
different distinctions that are made in utilitarian theory. All of this 
requires further explication to make Barnett's position clear. 
Begin with the distinction between act and rule utilitarianism. 
Act utilitarianism takes the individual action as the morally rele­
vant unit. Thus, "act so that your action produces the best conse­
quences of all the available actions" is an act utilitarian principle. 
For example, if in a particular case, breaking your promise produces 
greater utility than keeping it, then act utilitarianism requires you 
to break your promise. Rule utilitarianism takes general rules as 
the morally relevant unit. Thus, "act so that your action is in con­
formity with the set of moral rules that maximizes utility as com­
pared to other possible rule sets" is a rule utilitarian principle. 
Even if promise breaking would maximize utility on this particular 
occasion, rule utilitarianism might require you to keep your prom-
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ise if the utility-maximizing set of moral rules required that 
promises be kept. Barnett states that his approach evaluates the 
utility of "practices" (p. 23), suggesting that he is not an act utilita­
rian but a "practice" utilitarian. 
What does Barnett mean by "practice"? Initially, he does not 
mean moral rules, such as "keep your promises" or "do not lie." 
This is clear from his statement that he does not have a comprehen­
sive moral theory, "a theory of how persons ought to pursue the 
good life" (p. 23). By "practice," he evidently means to refer only 
to practices that lie within the sphere of social ordering or law. 
Moreover, Barnett's approach does not seem to allow for the evalu­
ation of individual legal rules (such as particular statutes) by assess­
ing their utility. Barnett makes this clear when he says that if 
utilitarianism is "a method of decision making in which the effects 
of various policies are assessed by determining their effects" (p. 24) 
then his view is not utilitarian. Rather, it appears that the relevant 
unit is the conception of justice.28 We assess conceptions of justice 
by considering their impact on happiness, peace, and prosperity, 
and then we assess individual legal rules (statutes, common law 
rules, etc.) by their conformity to the conception of justice. 
Why should we limit our utility assessment to conceptions of 
justice and avoid the assessment of individual legal rules or even 
individual actions? Several explanations might be available to 
Barnett. One possibility is that Barnett believes conception-of-jus­
tice utilitarianism to be extensionally equivalent29 to legal-rule utili­
tarianism and/or act utilitarianism; in other words, the choice of 
unit for utility assessment makes no difference in practice. This 
explanation, however, seems inconsistent with Barnett's insistence 
that his theory does not assess the utilities of individual legal rules 
or policies (p. 24). 
Another possibility is that Barnett believes that conception-of­
justice utilitarianism is preferable to legal-rule utilitarianism or act 
utilitarianism because of problems of knowledge, interest, or 
power. For example, Barnett may believe that if individuals 
attempt to act in conformity with act utilitarianism, they will fail 
because they lack sufficient knowledge to assess the utility of their 
actions. It is not clear, however, that a similar argument can be 
28. The text should be qualified in the following respect. The utility of individual legal 
rules could be a proper step in the assessment of conceptions of justice. Thus, one might 
proceed as follows. One takes a conception of justice. One then evaluates the various legal 
rules that would follow from the conception of justice for utility. This procedure is iterated 
until the various conceptions of justice have been evaluated. The conception with the highest 
utility score is then selected. That conception is then used to evaluate individual legal rules. 
Individual legal rule utility would play its role only at the state of selecting the best concep­
tion of justice. 
29. See DAVID LYONS, FORMS AND LIMITS OF UTILITARIANISM x (1965). 
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made to justify the selection of conception-of-justice utilitarianism 
over legal-rule utilitarianism. This is because the problem of 
knowledge is likely to be more acute for conceptions of justice than 
it is for individual legal rules. Utility assessments require knowl­
edge of consequences, and consequences are relatively easier to 
predict for individual legal rules than they are to predict for entire 
conceptions of justice. Conceptions of justice impact many legal 
rules and may be consistent with several different alternative sets of 
legal rules. For this reason, scoring the utility of entire conceptions 
of justice is likely to pose greater problems of knowledge than scor­
ing the utility of individual legal rules. 
Another possibility is that Barnett would appeal here to 
problems of interest to justify conception-of-justice utilitarianism. 
Perhaps legal rulemakers are likely to be partial in their selection of 
legal rules if they use utility as a standard because the utility of 
individual legal rules may appear ambiguous or uncertain and 
hence provide insufficient guidance. If, on the other hand, legal 
rule makers act in accord with the liberal conception of justice, they 
may be able to avoid the problem of partiality, precisely because 
the liberal conception forbids the selection of partial rules by guar­
anteeing rights of several property, freedom of contract, and so 
forth. These possibilities are not discussed in Structure. What is 
clear is that Barnett himself provides no justification for 
conception-of-justice utilitarianism, and that such a justification is 
required if such a utilitarian theory is to provide deep foundations 
for The Structure of Liberty. 
These matters are further complicated by the distinction 
between direct and indirect consequentialism. The direct/indirect 
distinction could be used synonymously with the distinction 
between act and rule utilitarianism.30 But this distinction is also 
used to reflect a related but different distinction, that between prin­
ciples "for use in practical moral thinking"31 and decisions that 
"would be arrived at by leisured moral thought in completely ade­
quate knowledge of the facts, as the right answer in a specific 
case."32 If Barnett's approach were indirect in this sense, this 
would mean that the foundational moral theory is act utilitarianism. 
Act utilitarianism would be the theory that would be used to evalu­
ate the individual actions made as a result of legal rules from the 
point of view of leisured moral thought unconstrained by problems 
30. Act utilitarianism would be said to be direct, because individual actions are evaluated 
directly for their utility. Rule utilitarianism would be said to be indirect, because acts are 
evaluated for utility indirectly via the system of rules. 
31. R.M. Hare, Ethical Theory and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND 31 
(Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). 
32. Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams, Introduction to UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, 1, 
15 (Amartya Sen & Bernard Williams eds., 1982). 
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of knowledge and interest. The liberal conception of justice would 
provide principles for use in practical moral thinking at the level of 
legal rule formulation, and the legal rules would provide practical 
principles for use by individual agents when making decisions con­
cerning the use of resources in social interactions.33 If this interpre­
tation is correct, then Barnett was in error when he stated that his 
approach is utilitarian in the sense that it "evaluates practices by 
their consequences" (p. 23). 
The text of Structure is not sufficiently explicit on this issue to 
permit a confident judgment as to, whether Barnett intends his the­
ory to be indirect in this sense. One consideration favoring this in­
terpretation of Structure is that indirect utilitarianism has been 
justified on grounds that are very similar to what Barnett calls the 
problems of knowledge and interest. Thus, R.M. Hare, the philoso­
pher most strongly associated with indirect utilitarianism, explained 
that the direct application of act utilitarian principles is "appropri­
ate only to 'a cool hour', in which there is time for unlimited investi­
gation of the facts, and there is no temptation to special 
pleading."34 Given the central role that the problems of knowledge 
and interest play in Structure, it would seem that Hare's indirect 
utilitarianism is at least consistent with many of Barnett's central 
ideas. 
The choice between the two interpretations of Barnett's 
remarks on utilitarianism is not merely an academic exercise. It has 
profound implications for the status of the liberal conception of jus­
tice. Conception-of-justice utilitarianism holds that actions or legal 
rules violating the liberal conception of justice violate a moral duty 
if they violate the conception that maximizes utility. If this is 
Barnett's position, then the constraints of the liberal conception are 
strong constraints. They cannot be overridden by showing that a 
particular action or legal rule would maximize utility even though it 
violates the conception. 
Indirect utilitarianism does not entail that the liberal conception 
of justice creates strong constraints. If the liberal conception is sup­
ported by indirect utilitarianism, then it provides the standard for 
ordinary, practical moral deliberation. · But its conclusions could be 
overridden if cool reflection with adequate knowledge and assess­
ment of possible problems of partiality reveals that a particular 
legal rule would maximize utility, even if that rule violates the lib­
eral conception. Since legal rule formulation frequently does take 
place under conditions of cool reflection, it would seem plausible 
33. But there might be other moral principles that would address other questions, such as 
whether one should keep one's noncontractual promises, whether to give to charity, and so 
forth. 
34. Hare, supra note 30, at 31. 
1804 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 97:1780 
that this possibility would be more than merely theoretical. The 
distinction between conception-of-justice utilitarianism and indirect 
act utilitarianism correlates with the difference between a liberal 
conception of justice as the ultimate standard of political morality 
and the liberal conception of justice as a practical guideline for 
political and legal choice. 
3. A Deontological Interpretation 
So far, I have considered the possibility that Structure rests on 
deep foundations in utilitarian moral theory, but there are passages 
that suggest something quite different. Despite the emphasis in 
Structure on happiness, peace, and prosperity as goals, there are 
other passages that suggest a deontological moral theory as the 
deep foundation for the liberal conception of justice. The most 
striking passage occurs near the close of Barnett's discussion of the 
question of whether his views are utilitarian: "[R]especting natural 
rights, not the calculation and aggregation of subjective prefer­
ences, promotes the common good. And the common good is 
viewed, not as a sum of preference satisfaction, but as the ability of 
each person to pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while acting 
in close proximity to others" (p. 24; emphasis added). 
This passage is problematic for a number of reasons. Initially, 
there is the use of the phrase "common good,"35 which suggests that 
a consequentialist or teleological reason is being offered. Common 
good, however, is defined in a way that might belie this suggestion. 
The definition of common good is "the ability of each person to 
pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity while acting in close prox­
imity to others" (p. 24). One interpretation of this phrase is that 
the justification for the liberal conception of justice rests on a moral 
right of each person to a set of legal rights governing social interac­
tions that create an equal opportunity for the pursuit of happiness. 
It is apparent that the interpretation I have just offered differs in 
several respects from Barnett's own formulation. In order to make 
this transformation plausible, a number of issues should be 
considered. 
Initially, there is a minor difficulty with the qualifying phrase "in 
close proximity to others" that concludes the definition of the com­
mon good (p. 24). It seems unlikely that Barnett intends this phrase 
to be taken in its literal sense. Surely physical proximity is not rele­
vant here. There is no good reason to believe that the liberal con­
ception of justice would apply to humans who live in dense urban 
environments like New York City but would not apply to Navaho 
people who choose to live in geographically dispersed locales. 
35. So far as I can tell, the phrase "common good" occurs only in this passage. This is the 
only entry for "common good" that appears in the index of Structure. P. 339. 
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More likely, proximity is used here to signify conditions under 
which humans engage in significant social interaction with respect 
to the use of resources and the exchange of services. Another 
minor point concerns the inclusion of peace in the list of things that 
each individual should have an ability to pursue (p. 24). It seems 
likely that peace is one of the conditions that make the pursuit of 
happiness and prosperity possible. There is no good reason to be­
lieve that each individual should have the ability to pursue peace.36 
The next question concerns the meaning of "the ability of each 
person to pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity" (p. 24; emphasis 
added). What is meant by ability here? Without reference to con­
text, one might interpret ability to mean individual capacity, but 
this seems implausible. Nothing in Structure suggests that Barnett 
is concerned with providing either the character traits or intellec­
tual development that would facilitate the pursuit of happiness and 
prosperity. A more plausible interpretation is that ability here is 
being used to refer to opportunity. Thus, the notion is that each 
individual should have an opportunity to pursue happiness and 
prosperity. 
Two more questions remain concerning this formulation: What 
quantum of opportunity should be provided and how should it be 
distributed across persons? Should we maximize the opportunity 
·set without regard to the distribution of opportunities among per­
sons? This interpretation seems implausible, both because this fails 
to give meaning to the qualifier "each" in "each person" and be­
cause Barnett's move to the common good is explicitly aimed 
against a maximizing approach. A plausible interpretation is that 
each person should have an adequate opportunity to pursue happi­
ness and prosperity, equal to the opportunity provided to every 
other person. A variation of this would require that each person 
have the maximum opportunity to pursue happiness and prosperity, 
consistent with an equal opportunity for every other person. 
Structure has little to say that would permit us to choose between 
these two formulations. 
Suppose then that the foundational principle of Structure is that 
each and every person should be given the maximum opportunity 
to pursue happiness and prosperity that is consistent with an equal 
opportunity for every other person .- call this the "opportunity­
for-happiness principle" for short. The liberal conception of justice 
would then be the set of background rights that satisfies this princi­
ple, given the problems of knowledge, interest, and power. This 
36. Peace is most plausibly seen as a condition for the individual pursuit of happiness and 
prosperity. It does not seem plausible to posit the opportunities of individuals to pursue 
peace as a foundational goal. Although some individuals may have life plans that include 
working for peace, there is no reason that each and every individual should be provided the 
opportunity to pursue this particular calling as opposed to any other. 
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principle is most naturally viewed as rooted in a deontological ap­
proach to ethics. One example of deontological ethics is Thomas 
Scanlon's contractualism, which holds that an action is wrong if it 
would be disallowed by any principle that no one could reasonably 
reject.37 The opportunity-for-happiness principle might plausibly 
be seen as one that no one could reasonably reject, although I can­
not sketch the argument for that conclusion on this occasion. The 
deontological interpretation also finds some support in the text of 
Structure. Barnett suggests that his approach is difficult to distin­
guish from one in which "[r]ights are used to create a legal system 
which defines a set of compossible territories that provides the nec­
essary political condition for the possibility that individuals might" 
pursue happiness and prosperity.38 Barnett acknowledges that such 
an approach might be deontological (p. 24). 
If Structure has deontological foundations, once again there are 
important implications for the content and status of the liberal con­
ception of justice. Deontological foundations are likely to lead to 
the view that the liberal conception imposes strong constraints on 
the content of legal rules. One of the important differences 
between consequentialist and deontological morality concerns the 
question of whether good consequences can override moral rules, 
such as the rule of political morality provided by the liberal concep­
tion of justice. Deontological theories severely constrain or even 
forbid the overriding of such moral rules on the grounds that good 
consequences would accrue. Moreover, the content of the liberal 
conception of justice might change once the requirements of the 
underlying deontological moral foundations were laid bare. 
Because Barnett does not take a stand on these fundamental issues, 
they cannot be resolved without doing extensive reconstruction of 
Structure's foundations. 
C. Public Reasons 
So far, my discussion of Structure's fundamental premises has 
focused on the possibility that the liberal conception of justice has 
deep foundations in a comprehensive moral theory of the good. 
There are, however, cogent reasons to believe that Barnett wishes 
to avoid commitment to any particular comprehensive doctrine. 
The way that Barnett phrases his reluctance is quite odd. He sug­
gests that he is simply not interested in the way his views would be 
categorized by contemporary academic moral and political philoso­
phy. He writes, "I care less about a topology of the reasons I ad-
37. See T.M. SCANLON, WHAT WE OWE TO EACH OnrnR 197 (1998); T.M. Scanlon, Con· 
tractualism and Utilitarianism, in UTILITARIANISM AND BEYOND, supra note 30, at 103. 
38. P. 24 (quoting DOUGLAS B. RASMUSSEN & DOUGLAS J. DEN UYL, LIBERTY AND 
NATURE 115 (1991)). 
May 1999] Structure of Liberty 1807 
vance for a particular conception of justice and the rule of law than 
I do the reasons themselves" (p. 24). Surely, Barnett is right to re­
ject classification as an end in itself, but neatness in academic label­
ing is not the reason one might wish to know about the 
foundational status of Structure. There are profound differences 
between the various moral theories that might serve a foundational 
role for Structure. I have already explored some of the ways that 
such differences might affect the force and content of the liberal 
conception of justice. In addition, there is another difference of 
substantial importance. Foundational theories are controversial. 
To the extent that the argument of Structure rests on normative 
premises derived from a comprehensive moral doctrine, that argu­
ment will be unconvincing to those who reject the premises. We 
therefore should consider the question of whether Structure needs 
deep moral foundations at all. 
Could The Structure of Liberty stand instead on the shallow 
foundations provided by the resources of public reason? We can 
investigate this question by examining the account of political justi­
fication offered by Rawls in his book Political Liberalism. 39 Rawls 
believes that it is unrealistic to expect agreement on the deep foun­
dations for our political convictions. Why not? Rawls's answer de­
pends on two further ideas: the fact of pluralism and the burdens of 
judgment. Modem democratic societies are characterized by what 
Rawls calls "the fact of pluralism" - the fact that there is a "plural­
ity of conflicting, and indeed incommensurable, conceptions of the 
meaning, value and purpose of human life. "40 In societies like ours, 
there are many different religious and moral views about what sort 
of life is best and what is the nature of the good. Moreover, the 
plurality of comprehensive religious and moral views is a durable 
feature of modem political life because of what Rawls calls "bur­
dens of judgment. "41 Disagreement (about matters such as the ulti­
mate moral foundations of a conception of justice) is expected and 
reasonable given the difficulties of coming to consensus about these 
topics. These difficulties include: complex and conflicting evi­
dence, disagreement about what is relevant and how to weigh the 
considerations that are relevant, the underdeterminacy introduced 
by hard cases, the fact that there may be different kinds of Jlorma­
tive arguments on both sides of a moral question, and differences in 
forms of life that lead to different standards for the evaluation of 
evidence and argument.42 
39. RAwr.s, supra note 20. 
40. John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4 
(1987); see also Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Justice, 39 DEPAUL L. REv. 1083, 1087-89 
(1990). 
41. RAwr.s, supra note 20, at 54-58. 
42. See id. at 56-57. 
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These considerations suggest an alternative explanation for 
Barnett's reluctance to commit to deep moral foundations. His re­
luctance might reflect the notion that such foundations are inappro­
priate for a theory of justice that is to regulate the basic structure of 
a pluralist society. We have already seen that Barnett does not take 
a clear stand about the sort of political justification that is appropri­
ate for his theory. There are, however, elements of Barnett's ap­
proach that strongly suggest that a society ordered by the liberal 
conception of justice would be a pluralist society. First, the liberal 
conception would create the conditions for pluralism. Although 
Barnett's theory does not directly address freedom of thought and 
expression, the constraints of the liberal conception of justice would 
seem to require that human communication be ordered by a regime 
of private property and contract and not be regulated by the state. 
Under these conditions, we would expect there to be a variety of 
comprehensive moral and religious doctrines of the good. Second, 
Barnett's discussion of the first order problem of knowledge sug­
gests that he believes that humans do not all share the same set of 
interests and values. One aspect of the first order problem of 
knowledge is that persons have individual knowledge of their own 
interests and values; such individual knowledge presumes that such 
interests are different for different persons. Third, Barnett is ex­
plicit that his theory is not committed to any particular conception 
of the good: "The approach presented here does not provide a the­
ory of how persons ought to pursue the good life" (p. 23). For these 
three reasons, Barnett's views are at least compatible with the 
premise that a society ordered by the liberal conception of justice 
would be a pluralist society. 
What sort of justification is appropriate for the conception of 
justice that is to order the basic structure of a pluralist society? 1\vo 
considerations suggest that the appropriate justification should not 
rest on particular moral or philosophical views about the good. 
First, as a practical matter, justifications rooted in comprehensive 
doctrines are not likely to work beyond the group of existing adher­
ents to the doctrine. Thus, if Structure had been rooted in a particu­
lar r�ligious view, such as Catholicism or Islam, or if it had been 
grountled on a particular moral theory, such as Kant's theory or 
comprehensive act-utilitarianism, the argument of Structure would 
have had limited appeal. Second, as a matter of political morality, 
it can be argued that the legitimacy of a society regulated by a con­
ception of justice depends in part on that conception having a justi­
fication that can be accepted as reasonable by those who will live in 
the society. Rawls calls this idea "the liberal principle of legiti­
macy." This principle holds that "our exercise of political power is 
proper and hence justifiable only when it is exercised in accordance 
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with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens may reason­
ably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals 
acceptable to them as reasonable and rational."43 It is not reason­
able to expect citizens who hold their own comprehensive views 
about religion and morality to endorse the conception of justice 
that regulates their society on the basis of a different comprehen­
sive doctrine. For example, Baptists could not reasonably be ex­
pected to endorse utilitarianism, Buddhism, or secular humanism as 
the fundamental foundation for the principles that regulate the ba­
sic structure of society. 
Given that it is neither practical nor fair to rest the justification 
for a conception of justice on controversial moral and religious 
views about the good life, what is the alternative? Tue justification 
for a conception of justice can be limited to the resources of public 
reason, the common reason of all the rational and reasonable mem­
bers of a community.44 These resources include common sense, the 
uncontroversial conclusions of science, and values that can be 
derived from the public political culture. By limiting the justifica­
tion of the liberal conception of justice to public reason, Barnett 
would make his theory accessible to those who adhere to a wide 
variety of religious and moral doctrines. Rawls postulates that in 
these circumstances a conception of justice could become the focus 
of an overlapping consensus.45 Tue adherents of various compre­
hensive doctrines would find their own deep foundations for the 
public values on which the conception rests. 
Can Structure rest on foundations limited to public reason? Tue 
answer to this question is surely yes, because for the most part, it 
already does. Tue development of the problems of knowledge, 
interest, and power is accomplished through the use of common 
sense and uncontroversial premises. It is true that the factual con­
clusions that Barnett draws from these premises are controversial; 
Barnett argues that the problems of knowledge, interest, and power 
create strong constraints on the role of the state. This feature of 
Structure is not problematic, however, so far as the requirements of 
public reason are concerned. So long as novel and controversial 
factual conclusions are supported with the resources of public rea­
son, these conclusions are accessible to reasonable persons who ad­
here to a wide variety of comprehensive doctrines.46 
Do the normative premises of Structure comport with the re­
quirements of public reason? More particularly, is the "common 
43. Id. at 217. 
44. See id. at 212-54. 
45. See id. at 133-72. 
46. See Lawrence B. Solum, Novel Public Reasons, 29 LoY. L.A. L. REv. 1459, 1476-77 
(1996). 
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good . . .  viewed, not as a sum of preference satisfaction, but as the 
ability of each person to pursue happiness, peace, and prosperity" 
(p. 24) a value that can be derived from the public political culture? 
A full answer to this question is outside the scope of this review, but 
a tentative inquiry suggests that there are good reasons to believe 
that Structure's definition of the common good satisfies the stric­
tures of public reason. The goal, providing each person the oppor­
tunity to pursue happiness and prosperity, is formulated with 
sufficient generality and abstraction to avoid commitment to any 
particular moral or religious conception of the good. If we focus on 
the United States as a case study, similar goals are deeply rooted in 
our public political culture. For example, the Preamble of the 
United States Constitution includes "domestic Tranquility" and 
"the general Welfare" as aims. Moreover, it seems likely that 
opportunities for happiness, peace, and prosperity are values that 
could be affirmed by individuals who adhere to a wide variety of 
religious and moral views about ultimate questions of good. Even if 
Barnett's precise formulation of these goals might be objectionable, 
it seems likely that an alternative formulation could fill the needed 
role in the argument. Because the problems of knowledge, interest, 
and power are so pervasive, the core argument of Structure would 
survive if "the general welfare" or "opportunity of individuals to 
pursue chosen plans of life" were substituted for happiness and 
prosperity. 
Thus, a persuasive case can be made that the best interpretation 
(or reformulation) of the argument of Structure would eschew the 
need for deep foundations and rely instead on a shallow foundation 
constructed only from the materials of public reason. This move, 
however, cannot be made without paying a price. For example, to 
the extent that the argument of Structure relies at any point on max­
imization of happiness and prosperity as the justification for not 
limiting or qualifying the rights contained in the liberal conception 
of justice, that feature of the argument would no longer be valid. 
The values that can be affirmed by the public reason of a pluralist 
society are necessarily less robust than those which are located 
within particular comprehensive doctrines. Whereas utilitarianism 
or Kantianism may have determinate implications for particular 
questions about the form or content of legal rights, public political 
values are likely to become relatively more underdeterminate as 
the question at issue becomes more concrete. The implication for 
Structure is that any robust conclusions will need to be supported by 
arguments that rely on the problems of knowledge, interest, and 
power for their cutting force. 
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III. THE FOURTH ORDER PROBLEM OF KNOWLEDGE 
1811 
Finally, I would like to take up an issue that arose in connection 
with the question of whether Structure should be interpreted as 
resting on a form of rule utilitarianism.47 The argument of Structure 
depends on knowledge of consequences. The liberal conception of 
justice is preferred over the alternatives, because the liberal concep­
tion fares better with respect to the problems of knowledge, inter­
est, and power. Moreover, Structure claims that the role of such 
consequentialist arguments should be indirect rather than direct.48 
We should evaluate individual legal rules by the liberal conception 
of justice; consequences should be brought to bear only at the level 
of selecting the conception. 
There is, however, a problem of knowledge associated with this 
method of analysis. Let us call this problem "the fourth order prob­
lem of knowledge." This problem of knowledge stems from the fact 
that it is relatively more difficult to assess the consequences of 
whole conceptions of justice than it is to assess individual legal 
rules. There are several reasons why this is so. Initially, the conse­
quences of adopting whole conceptions of justice cannot be as­
sessed directly. Problems of knowledge, interest, and power arise 
in concrete choice situations, and attend to individual legal rules 
that govern those situations. In addition, the consequences of 
whole conceptions of justice are global in nature. When we com­
pare two conceptions of justice on the basis of their consequences, 
the task is an enormous one. Because so many individual legal 
rules will change, it is a daunting task to simply trace out the causal 
connections one by one. This problem is compounded by the diffi­
culty of assessing the interactions between simultaneous changes in 
many different legal rriles. Finally, the problem of assessing conse­
quences is complicated by the fact that abstract conceptions of jus­
tice may be satisfied by several different sets of particular legal 
rules. Selecting the optimum set for each conception of justice is 
itself a difficult task. 
If we accept that the fourth-order problem of knowledge is real 
and substantial, what are the implications for Structure? The most 
important implication concerns the status of the liberal conception 
of justice. Given the fourth order problem of knowledge, it seems 
difficult to sustain Barnett's claim that consequences should not 
play a role in the design of particular legal rules. Of course, there 
may be countervailing considerations that would caution against 
departure from the requirements of the liberal conception of justice 
on the basis of a rule-by-rule assessment of the consequences. For 
47. See supra text accompanying notes 27-28. 
48. See discussion supra section II.B.2. 
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example, problems of partiality may counsel against individualized 
assessment of consequences. Based on this preliminary assessment, 
however, the fourth order problem of knowledge would appear to 
be a substantial one. There does not seem to be any a priori reason 
to believe that problems of partiality would always trump the fourth 
order problem of knowledge. 
If the fourth order problem of knowledge justifies departures 
from the liberal conception of justice, does this strengthen or 
weaken Structure? On the one hand, it might be argued that the 
power of the theory is weakened, because it would no longer pro­
vide trumping a priori arguments against departures from the 
liberal conception based on particularized assessment of conse­
quences. On the other hand, this very weakness might actually en­
hance the persuasiveness of the argument as a whole, particularly to 
readers who are intuitively uncomfortable with the radical conclu­
sions reached in Structure. Once the fourth order problem of 
knowledge is taken into account, those readers are free to get off 
the boat when they believe that a departure from the liberal con­
ception is justified. The price of justifiable exit, however, is a per­
suasive argument that the problems of knowledge, interest, and 
power have really been taken into account. This approach leaves 
intact the central argument of Structure and creates the maximum 
room for both liberal and conservative foes to constructively en­
gage its arguments. In the end, a frank acknowledgement of the 
fourth order problem of knowledge can strengthen the force and 
persuasiveness of Structure's core. 
CONCLUSION 
The Structure of Liberty makes substantial contributions to fun­
damental debates over the proper function of law. Perhaps the 
most important contribution of Structure is its detailed development 
of the problems of knowledge, interest, and power. The accessibil­
ity of the arguments for the importance of these problems opens up 
an opportunity for readers unfamiliar with the libertarian tradition 
of social thought to engage with ideas that have a power to provoke 
rethinking of fundamental assumptions about the proper function 
of law. Hardly less significant is Structure's wealth of creative ideas 
about concrete problems of social policy, especially with respect to 
the alternatives to our dismal practices of punishment. The 
Structure of Liberty puts a provocative set of ideas on the table for 
discussion. That these ideas will be taken up seems assured by the 
power and clarity of Professor Barnett's important book. 
